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INTRODUCTION.

The ?following article is
ality of

a discussion of the constitution-

Section 29 of the NEW YORK LIQUOR TAX LAW ; commonly

known as the "RAINES" law,named after the father of the bill.
The section in question declares substantially,that when one
is known to be selling liquor without a license,that the
District Attorney,or County Treasurer shall make a motion
before an Equity courtfor an order to have the one so selling
appear and show cause why he should not be enjoined.
failure to show cause

{thich is

On his
is

a foregone conclusion)-,he

enjoined personally from sellifg liquor until he pays the tax.
If

he then sells without paying the tax,he is

before the Court and sentenced

to be brought

for eontempt.

It is claimed that this mode of procedure contravenes
Article I Section 2 of the New York State Constitution:

"In

ai.l cases where the jury trial was had heretofore it shall
remain inviolate forever
The question thus arises,whether the legislature,in declaring
that an offenceformerly criminalshall be tried in an Equity
courthas overstepped the bounds set by the Constitution.
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CHAPTER

I

RIGHT OF JURY TRIAL UNDER THE CLAUSE
"AS HERETOFORE EXISTING"

The right of trial by Jury is secured to the people in the
United States Courts by the Federal Constitution,and all the State
Constitutions have provisions relating thereto.

Although the

phraseology varies in the different states,still the vital part
of each is practically the same;

that the jury triallin all its

substantial qualities,is,and remains,secured inviolately forever.
The New York Constitution (Art. Sec.2) secures the rigit in
the following terms: "The trial by jury,in all cases where it has
been heretofore usedshall remain inviolate forever.'

This word-

ing is similar' to that in most of the other statesand identical
with quite a number.

Twenty-one state constitutions declare that

the right shall remain inviolate,though not stating that it shall
be "used as heretofore"'
The following is a collection of decisions in

states having

provision practically identical with New York.
New Hampshire,

The case of Copp v Henniker (a) held the phrase,"As

heretofore used",to refer to the provincial law as modified by the
statutes passed between 1776 and 1792.

But the leading case of

(b)

King v Hopkins~held that the construction of the phrase should be
that given by Judge Parker in Pierce v State

(c) ,that ,"The jury

trial intended by the Constitution was the pure and genuine jury
Ia) 55 N.H.179 at p.192
(b) 57 N.H.554

(c) 13 N.H.557.

2
trial of English and American Common Law"

Though the early

American judges sometimes made singular work of itit is to be
they meant to give the parties their full Connn. ..luw

inferred,that
rights.

Such an understanding and intention are of vastly more

weightthan the fact that they failed to give such rights,because
of their unfamiliarity with the law.

And as for the judges whom

had no such intention,their rulings and decisions should have no
weight at all.

They tried to decide cases not by any scientific

application of legal rules,but upon principles of "common sense and
Though such a system of coming to a decision may be

justice'

satisfactory in a given caseits universal adoption would be fatal
to scientific jurisprudence.

One example will show the fallacy

be absolutely
of construing the clause in
and procedure in

Decisions of such a nature should

the Constitutionto refer to the law

the Colonies,immediately precedimg; the Revolution.

Judge Dudley was regarded,by the leading men of his time,as "The
best judge

in New Hampshire!

charges to a jury (a),
has been said in

The following is one of his

"You have heard,gentlemen

this case by the lawyers -

of the jury,what

the rascals

!

But no,

I will not abuse them,it is their business to make a good case for
their clients.
else to consider.

........

But you and Igentlemen,have something

They talk of law.

we want,but justice..........
are worth more than all
business to do justice

(a) Life of Wm Plummer.

Why,gentlemen, it

is

not law

A clear head and an honest heart
the law of the lawyers.........
between the parties.

It

is

our

Not by any quirk of the

3
law out of

Coke or Blackstonebooks

that I never read and never

will,but by common sense and common honesty,as between man and man
And Now Mr Sheriff,take out the jury; and youMr Foreman,
do not keep us waiting with idle talk, of which ther has been too.
much alreadyabout matters which have nothing to do with the case"'
The phrase,"as heretofore existing"means the common law of
England modified by American conditionsthat is,tie Common Law of
England,such parts only being excepted,as are inconsistent with the
Constitution,or not applicable to the institutions or circumstances
of this Country

(a).

In Massachusetts

This is the general rule

(b).

"as heretofore used",is

construed to mean,

as at Common Law (c).
In Maine

it

is

held that a Court

Martial trial

necessarily include a hearing before a jury,as
have juries at common law.(d).,

In

does not

such Courts did not

Coffin v Coffin(e)

stat., ed that,"The case does not come within the clause

the Court

of the Con-

stitutionas the practice has been otherwise at Common Law"
In

Pennsylvania

it

was stated,in Emeric v Harris

(f),that

the

legislature cannot impose any provisions substantially restrictive
of the right of trial by jury.

So,although a law has been passed,

giving power to a justice to hold trial
a jury,still
(a)

(e)
(f)

in

such law was constitutional,as

certain cases without
it

covered only cases

66 N.H.53 p.72.
(b) Cooley Const.Lim. #32-34. (c) Charles
River Bridge v Warren4Bridge"7 Pick.365.
Stockbridge Iron Co.
v Hudson Co.102 Mass.4 p.48
Howe v Cambridge 114 Mass 390
Bigelow v Bigelow,120 Mass 320 p.321.
Davis v Davis 123 Mass
590 at p.593.
Cd) Ranson v Brown 18 Me. 16 p.218. 25 Me.488
55 .Me 361 p.362. Saco v Wentworth 37 Me 156 p.172 Randall v
Kehlor 60 Me 43 p 44 Dun v Burleigh 62 Me 24 p.37.
1 Binney (Pa) 416,p.424.
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which had been so tried at common law(a).
In Illinois,the constitution of 1870(b) declares,"The right of
But

trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate"

in the two preceding Constitutions the section reads simply,"Shall
remain inviolate(c).

Thus the Constitution of 1870 refers to th

right as existing under the preceding eonstitutions,which did not
contain "as heretofore",so that Illinois cannot be brought into the
group of states having the clause "as heretofore used"
Maryland.

State v Buchanan (d) declares,"Our ancestors

brought with them the Common Law of England,and to their judicial
decisions we are to look for the evidences of that law."

"

'

As

heretofore use4,' refers to the common law of England before the
Revolution (e).
In Delaware,State v Williams(f) holds that,"the common law
obtains in America,where it suits our conditionand nothing in the
Constitution prohibits it."
Missouri. "The general rule of constructionln reference to
this provision of the constitution,is that any act,which destroys o1
to
materially impairs the right of trial by juryaccording the course
of the common law,in cases proper for cognizance by a juryis unconstitutional. (g)

(a) In Matter of Pennsylvanian Hall,5 Pa St.204. p.208 Trimbles
Appeal,6 Watts 133.
(b) Const.Art 2 Sec.5. (c) Const.of 1818,
Art 13 Sec 6; Const.of 1818 Art 8 Sec 6. (d) 5 H.& J 317. p 356
Ce) Dashiel v Atty Gen.5 H.&c J 392. p 401; 2 Md 429 p 452; 16
Md.549 p.555
(i) 9 Houst 508 at p 525
(g) State v Vail 53 Mo
97 p 107.
See also Smith's Adifrs' v Smith 1 How (Miss) 102
p.105.
Lewis v Garret's Aikmr 5 How (Miss) 453.
Littleton v
Fritz 65 Ia 488 p.491.

5

In New York State the decisions hold practically the same way as
in the other states.

The cases under this clause in New Yor ,

will be treated of in the next chapter in connection with those discussing the right of jury trial in criminal cases arising under the
liquor laws.

6
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CHAPTER

JURY TRIAL IN CRIMINAL CASES
UNDER THE LIQUOR LAWS.

Numerous

cases can be found covering the point at issue,namely:

that a jury trial was a matter of right,under the Constitutionin
all cases of misdemeanor,especially for the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor.
In People v Kennedy(a) we find the following,"It is declared by
the Constitution of this State (Atr.l Sec.2)

'the trial by juryin

all cases where it has been heretofore usedshall remain inviolate
forever!

The obvious meaning of the expression 'heretofore used',

isin use at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
is meant by this expression,'trial by jury' ?

What

Does it mean a

comrmon law jury of twelve men,or a jury of six men,as provided
the trial

at Special Sessions ?

on this point.

if

I thinkV there can be no doubt

If the legislature may reduce a jury in number

to sixthey have the same right to reduce it in number to oneand
thus make a jury of one a compliance with the requirements of the
Constitution.

The Constitution secures a jury of twelve menwhose

verdict is to be unanimous

(See Hudson v River Ry Co v Cruger,2 Ker.-

nan 198; State v Cox 5 Sm.

& Mar.664;

4.)

(a)

3 Peters 446-7; 4 Wheat.242-3-

If,therefore,the accused,in an offence of this grade,had

2 Park 312 p.137

a
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right to a trial by jury,when the Constitution took effecthis
right cannot be taken away by subsequent act of the legislature.
It is no answer to say that his offence did not exist at the time
the Constitution ttook effect,but has since been created by statute.
If the offence be such that it would have been entitled to a trial
by juryif created before the Constitution was adoptedit cannot
be deprived of the same right when created afterwards.

Any other

view wdldcinable the legislature to create ajnew offence and call
it a felonymake it triable in a court of Special Sessionsand punishable by death.

If you deny the constitutional contrQl over

new as well as old offencesyou make the power of the legislature
omnipotent,and have no

protection against its despotism.

The

true rule undoubtedly is.,that when the legislature creates a new
offence it is placed on the same footing with other previous offences of the same gradeand is equally governed by the provisions
of the Constitution.

Selling liquor without a licence was then

(1 R.S.628 Sec.25),as now,declared~a misdemeanorbut it could only
be tried on indictment and by a full jury"
Under the "Raines" law (Sec.34),any one who shall neglect or
refuse to make application for certificate,or give the bond,or pa
the tax iposed4,as required by this act,is guilty of a misdemeanor.
By another section all misdemeanors,under the Act,are to be tried
in a Oourt of Record having jurisdiction over crimes of the grd
of felonies.

Selling liquor without a license has always been a

misaemeanor and triable only after indictment.

The present law

expressly declares it to be a misdemeanor,and that all misdemeanors

8

shall be tried in a Court having jurisdiction over felonies.

But

Sec."29" provides a method whereby equity takes cognizance of an
act criminal in its nature and after hating enjoined the personnot
the act,on a further breach of the law,proceeds to punish

summarily

an act of a purely criminal character.
People v Johnson.(a) was a case of petition for a writ of habeas
corpus to enquire into the cause of his detention.

The petitioner

had been arrested for violation of the liquor law,taken before a
magistratewhere he was refused a jury trtal.

It was held:" The

right of trial by jury is what the prisoner claims

....

There has

been no one subject which'has been so jealously guardedand so uniformly lauded since the date of the celebrated Magna Charta,as the
common law right to a trial by jury

....

As the Constitution,which

is the fundamental law -the permanent will of the majority- declares
that

'the trial by jury in all cases,where it has been heretofore

used shall remain inviolate forever',the legislature is prohibited
from depriving a person accused of a criminal oefence,of the right
of a trial by such jury,

The law in reference to an examination

applicable to other cases of miademeanoris alike applicable to
offences for selling liquor without a license"
With regard to legislative attempts to create new offencesand
put them in a special class,the case of Wood v City of Brooklyn(b)
is very pertinent.

"Section 2 of Article I of the Constitution

relates to classes,an,of course'includes the individual cases which

(a) 2 Park.322. p.325,
(b) 14 Barb.425,
p.432.
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they comprise.

In no other way can constitutional enactments

preserve that comtinued efficacy,which is so essential for the publiec goo*.

Whenevertherefore,a new case is added to a class,it

becomes subject to its rules.

To allow the legislature to except

from the operation of a constitutional provisionby direct enactmenta matter clearly falling within its meaning,would sanction a
fraud upon its organic lawand might,in the end,destroy its obli"gation"
If the offence of selling liquor without a licence is identical
with the offence at common law,then it is triable by juryand the
person charged is entitled to a jury trial.(a)
-Nor can an Equity Court assume jurisdiction to try cases of a criminal nature,,.i

In the case of Kramer v The Board of Police of

New York (b),Kramer sought to restrain the Board of Police by an
injunction in Equity from arresting him for selling wines etc.,in
the lobbies of places of amusement.
made misdemeanors by statute.

Such sales of liquors were

Kramer had requested the Court

below to grant the injunction,on the ground that his act was not
in violation of the statute. "The Court below held the plaintiff
not guilty of a crimethus trying in a Court of Equity the guilt
or innocence of a person accused of a crime on affidavit.

The ten-

dency has been to greatly extend the remedy of injunction in civil
cases,but certainly such remedy should be limited to civil cases,and
criminal cases left to the disposition of the criminal courts"'
(a) Warren v People 3 Park 544. p.551. Behan v people 3 Park 680.
People v Stevens 13 Wend.341. 4 N.Y.Crim.R.548. 2 Cowen's Crim.
R 433.
(b)

4 N.Y.Crim R 551
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In Davis v American Society &c (a),the Court declares very
clearly and concisely,that equity must keep its hands off criminal
matters.

The Court

holds as follows:

"Hence it cannot be dis-

puted that Bergli was acting under a valid law,and regular authority
and he had the right to make the threatened arrests,if the plaintiffs were actually engaged in violating the law to prevent cruelty
to animals.

The only question for %contestation*v,,as whet1h r,as-.a

matter of factithey were guilty or innocent of such violation; and
the determination of the question could not,by such an action as
thisbe drawn into a court of equity.

Whether a person accuded

of a crime,be guilty-or innD3ent,is to be determined in a common
law court by a jury; and the people,as well as the accused,have
the right to have it thus determined.

If this action in this case,

then it could in every case of a person accused of a crime,where the
same serious consequences would follow an arrest; and the

trial of

offendersin the constitutional mode prescribed by law,could forever be prohibited"
"But our laws

In Hill v People(b) we find the following:-

(organic

as well as statute) exempt persons,charged with criminal offences,
from coercive summary trials without a jury.

Our State constitu-

tion provides that the jury trial shall remain inviolate in all
cases where it has been heretofore used.

Under the

laws existing

at the adoption of the constitution,a justice could hold a court

(a) 75 N.Y.362
(b) 20 N.Y.366,p 368.
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of Special Sessionsand could try certain cases,but if proper security was given,the culprit must be tried at a court of Oyer ard
Terminer or General Sessions,where they could not be tried without
indictment,not* by any except a common law jury of twelve men."
Such must be the rule and such must -be the rights of persons charged
with misdemeanors now.

They have the right to have the complaint

exhibited before them,for any crime or misdemeanor,examined and
passed upon by a grand jury,before they can be coerced into a trial,
and if indicted to be tried by a jury of twelve men.

(a)
In People v Killeen, the clarter of the city of Yonkers gave the
city judge power to try excise cases.
for a- violation of the excise law.

The relator was arrested
He pleaded *Not Guilty",and

demanded a jury trialbut the court refused it.

It was held that

selling intoxicating liquors in violation of law,was an offence
triable by jury when the constitution was adopted.

"The term 'cases

in Art Isec.2,is used in a generic sense; it embraces grades or
clasesnot individual or particular cases,except as they make up
a class.

The intent of the constitution was to preserve the

right as amply as it was enjoyed at the time of its-,adoption"
It has been uniformly held that the sale of intoxicating liquor
without a license is a ctiminal offenceand punishable as such.
In the case of People v Charbineau( )the Court so held in the following language: "The learned counsel for the defendant contends t1at

T(a)

11 Hun.289 p 290

(b) 115 N.Y.433 p.4356.
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a sale without a -license is not a criminal offence.
than thirtY.::

But for more

years (17 N.Y.516),the courts,construing the Acthave

held such sales to be crimes; and that construction *hich is in
harmony with the previous laws on the same subject,which is in
accordance with the common understanding,and which has been acquiesced in by the legislatureshould prevail.41

It has been held ever

since that such an indictment charges a crime!'
In this connection it may be well to take a glance into the
construction of the Court of special Sessionsand the'right of
trial by jury therein.
By the present constitution,offences of the grade of misdemeanors may be tried by a Court of Special sessionsin any case
where the legislature so directs (Const.1896,Art 6.Sec.23).

This

section is the same as sec.26 of Art.6 of Constitution of 1870,
which was
that

power.

the first amendment to give a court of special Sessions
At first glance it would look as though these

sections abrogated the right of trial by juryin all cases where
the legislature saw fit so to do.
The first Actauthorizing the trial of petty offences by a
Court of Special Sessionscomposed of three justices,was passed
by the New York Colonial Legislatureseptember 1,1744.

Jurisdiction

was there given over "misdemeanors,breaches of the peace,and other
criminal offences,under the degree of grand larceny"'

(a) 1 Smith & Livingston 339
Van Shai ck, 240"

The same
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power was continued after the Revolutionby the Act of March 24th,
1787 (a)

Various modifications and amendments were adopted at

different times until 1824,when a jury was authorized to be summoned
on application of-the accused (b)

Tbe constitutional amendment,

empowering the legislature to grant courts

of Special Sessions

jurisdiction over all offences of the grade of misdemeanors was
enacted in 1870.

,For

the forty-six years immediately preceding

the amendment,juries of six men had been allowed in Courts of
Special Sessionsso that when the people gave the legislature power
to increase the jurisdiction of such courtsthey did it with the
understanding that the court should remain practically of the same
natute.

Certainly it cannot be presumed that the people have

given up their right of trial by jury in :&ll cases of misdemeanorin
the discretion of the legislature.

Howeverthe people by giving

a Court of Special sessions with a jury of six menthe authority to
try misdemeanors,did not "ipso facto",give the legislature the power
to declare that misdemeanors shall be tried in an I quity Court.
The Court of Special sessions is a criminal courtand can take cotnizance of all misdemeanors falling within its jurisdiction;

but an

Equity court has authority only over civil matters and cannot try
Selling liquor without a license
the criminality of an offence.
*is,and always has been,a misdemeanor,a criminal offence; and demandint as such,a criminal trial.
The question to be decided by the Equity court,under sec."29"
(a) 1 Greenleaf,424.
(b) Session Laws of 1824,297 #47.
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of the present law,is one merely of the guilt or innocence of the
#efendant.

The court is asked,first,to decide whether or not the

defendant is

selling liquor without a license.

As such a sale is

declaredby Section 34,to be a misdemeanotthe determination of this
of the defendant.

question involves merely the guilt or innocence
He is

then enjoined from further commission

is

not the place of business,but

it

is

is

enjoined ?

place.

restraining

of the said crime.
is

the person,who

the commission of a crime,pure

The person.

The nuisance

is

thereforethat

all

places and at all

ThUs

enjoined.

Who

and simple.

not the personbut the

But the injunction runs against the person

binding on him in

It

times.

ene

alldnd is

It would appear,

the legislature not only grants the Equity courts

jurisdiction in

criminal cases,but also compels the Court to use

its extraordinary remedies and powers in a given case.

It

has al-

ways been the general understanding that Equity would use its
ordinary power only in

extra-

cases where the law was powerless or insuf-

ficient to grant full relief.
discretion in the matter;

The Equity judge always used his

first,as to whether the legal remedy

really was inadequate,and, second,as
deserving equitable relief.

to whether

the case was one

The present law overthrows this

theory entirelyleaves no discretion intthe Courtand compels it
to act whire there is

no excuse for equitable

interference,and

goes so far as to direct the court to take cognizance
criminal offence.

even

of a purely

15
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CHAPTER

INJUNCTION REMEDY IN NUISANCE CASES.

It
the

is

set up in

act enjoined is

defence of the section under discussion, that
a nuisanceand therefore cognizable

in

an

Equity court.
A common nuisance is an offence against the publicby doing
the people generally;

injuries to all

or by omitting to do that

which t the common good requires.
The remedies for nuisance are twofold
I.

Prevenhtive
(a) Abate
(b) Indict
(c), Enjoin.

I I.Cpensatory
Action for damages.
Public

(or common)

nuisances,with all

their constituent facts

are public offencesand Equity may,in some casestake jurisdiction
to suppress

them; but only when no adequate remedy at law exists.

The legal remedy of indictment is always adequate,in a case of the
illegal

sale of liquor,except where irreparable

The mere sale never causes irreparable

injury is

threatenedk

injury to the public at larg@

and indictment should therefore be sufficient.
ance,only such remedy will be granted as is

In

cases of nuis-

necessary

to eliminate

16

the nuisance and nothing further,as the court interferes only to
Stop the nuisance and not to punish the offender.
The ordinary remedyand the one which is usually deemed sufficientis Abatement; in

respect to which numerous cases are to be

found.
Brown v Perkins declares that "Spirituous liquors are not of

them-

selves a common nuisance,but the act of keeping them for sale,may
The only legal method to stop it,is

be made such by statute.

the one directed by statutefor t1

seizure by warrantbringing

them before a magistrateand giving the owner of the property an
opportunity to defend his right to it.

As it is the use of the

buildingor the keeping of spirituous liquors in itwhich in general
constitutes the nuisance,the abatement consists in putting a stop
to such use
A

(a)

statute declaring places,in which intoxicating liquor is

illegally sold or kept for sale,to be conmon nuisances,does not
authorize the destruction of such buildings by private individuals
or by the public authorities.

The abatement of a nuisance,caused

by the illegal use of a buildingconsists in the prevention of the
future illegal useand not in the destruction of the building(b).
Under the guise of exercising the power of summary abatement
of nuisances,the legislature cannot take into its own hands the enforcement of the criminal or quasi criminal law(c).
In Fisher v McGirr Cd)

Chief Justice

haw makes use of the

Taunton v
(b) State v Paine,5 R.I.185,Ames,C.J.
(a) 15 Gray,89
(c) Taunton v Stee~l.
Steele,119 Mass 237,and cases there cited.
(d) 1 Gray 1 p. 2 6 .
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following language: "Suppose the object to beto prevent and punish
possession of intoxicating liquor

...

There seems to be two

distinct modes or courses of proceedingboth well known to the law,
but of considerable difference in their modes of operation; they
area proceeding in rem,by the sequestration of the property or
thing,which is noxious in itselfor made the instrument or subject
of a noxious and injurious use; The other,a proceeding in personaa,
for the punishment of the person of the offenderas an example to
Both are pro-

deter others from the commission of a like offence.

ceedings designated for the enforcement of the criminal law,and must
be governed by the rules applicable to its administration"
These few cases will show the theory on which the courts proceed in dealing with cases of nuisance;namely,to abate only the use
which constitutes the nuisance,and thus eliminate the nuisance
entirely.

The maintaining of certain nuisances is criminal,and

subjects the one maintaining them,to indictment.

It might be

well tp mention a few cases under this head.

A

"The remedy for abating a public nuisance is by indictmentand
not by removing it by forcewithout legal proceedings
to be a nuisance of that character'(a)

finding It

Upon conviction of a

nuisance,the court may punish by fine only,or they may also cause
The order of abatement is no part
the nuisance to be abated (b)
of the punishment,and issues,not as a matter of course,a~ter indictmenit,but such indictment forms the basia of the order of abatement(cl
(b) Waring v Mayer,24 Ala 701.
(a) Earpvv Lee,71 Ill 193.
State v Dudley 30 Me 65.
Ind.105.
v
State,112
Droneberber
v People,40 Mich 187.
Shepard
St.536
(c) Buzzard v State 25 0h.
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An individual cannot abate a common nuisance;

the remedy being by

Relief babatement or indictment beinC present,

indictment(a).

the court will not grant an injunction (b).

If neither abatement

or indictment are found to be sufficientthe remedy of injunction
may be used.
The earliest cases of injunction to restrain a common nuisance
were those relating to purprestures,namely,the enclosing of that
the early

which should be left open as belonging to the public.• In
case

of Attorney General v Richards

(c),the court enjoined any

further erection of structures between high and low water marks in
ports,mouths of harbors etc,and decreed that thos already

erected

should be abated.
The earliest case was in

the reign of Elizabeth.

1
An informatio

was filed by the Attorrey-General to restrain the erection of a
pidgeon house,by a tenant for years,of a parcel of a manor,the
reversion of which was in

the Queen.

The court being of opinion

that a pidgeon house was a common nuisance an injunction was granted
(d).

There was of course no valid ground for granting this in-

junction,but

it

in such matters.

shows very clearly the antiquity
In

of the jurisdiction

1752,in the case of Baines v Baker(e),a motion

for an injunction to stay the building of a house to inoculate for
small-pox,was5 denied,the Chancellor saying:

"Bills to restrain

nuisances must be extended tQ such only as are nuisances at law,.
State v Kernan 5 R.I.4977T5TPowell
Pane,5 R.I.185
a)sttev
(2 Aust.603, So also Bristol Harbor Case,18
v Foster,59 Ga 790.
(e) 3 Atk.750.
Cd) Eliz. Bond's CaseMo.238.
Ves.214.
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The proper method would be by information throught the AttorneyIn Attorney Gen.v Cleaver (a),Lord Eldon stated

General."

that "Instances of the interposition of this court upon the subject
of nuisances have been confined and rare".

Nor will Equity inter-

fere to stay proceedings in any criminal matter or case not strictly
of a civil nature,.
"Equity will grant an injunction to restrain a nuisance
it

a public

is

one and is

then only after it
irreparable

only where

asked for by the Attorney General;

and tb

has been tried at law; or extreme probability of

injury to the property of the plintiff

or his person"

(b)
Injunction will not be granted except

where irreparable

injury or

danger to health would follow (c)
In

our own state the leading case on this matter is

v Utica Ins Co(d)

Atty Gen.

Here an information was filed by the Attorney

General to obtain an injunction restraining defendant from acting
as a bank.

The company was established to conduct an insurance

businessbut was assuming the powers and functions of a bank,both
of issue and discount.

An act of the legislature declared anyone

subject to a fine who should become a member of any banking associationnot authorized by law.

Thus,in this casewe have a defen-

dant sought to be enjoined from pursuing a business which was illegal,as to him,until he complied with the statultory regulations
relating thereto.

fa) 18 ves.211 p.217.
(c)

The opinion,in the case,by the great Chancellor

(b Crandler v Tinkl,9

Wynstanley v Lee,3 Swanst.355.

Cd)

Vs.22Eldon)
2 Johns. Ch.371.
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Kent,is very applicable to the present case.
name,added

to the justice of the principles

The weight of hia
therein contained,

should make the opinion the best possible authority.

"Whether the

defendants have banking powers given themby the act by which they
are incorporated,is,strictly,a legal question.

It is equally

a question of law whether they were within the purview of the restraining act.

I have always understood it to be a general prin-

ciple,in respect to the powers of this courtthat when a cause
depends,simply and entirelyon the solution of a dry legal question,the proper forum for the determination of that question is
court of law.
stand it

a

It appears not to admit of doubt,nor do I under-

to be disputed,tha$ if

the defendants,as

a corporation,

have assumed powers not within their charterthe people

of this

state,by their Attorney Generalhave a complete and adequate remedy
at law,either by the cftmmbn.Aa1kwrit
formation in

the nature of such

usurpationor unlawfully

of

'quo

warranto',or

writ......

by an in-

If found guilty of

holding and executing any such office r

franchisethe Supreme Court may give judgment of ouster,and fine
the defendant for his unlawful usurpation-Land etc.
in

Prosecutions

the King's Bench appear to have been the established course.

Banking was formerly a common law right,but the legislature having
declared it

to require a franchise;

ege has its

adequate remedy by the public prosecutor in

Court.
diction...........

any usurpation of this privilthe Supreme

I cannot find that this Court has any concurrent jurisThe restraining act itself

considers

the act
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of banking without legislative authority,as an offencefor which
the party offending is subject to a penalty
contained in the information savors,thenso

The

.....

charge

much of a criminal

offence,that it would require a clear and settled practice to justify the interference

of this courtwhen that interference is not

called for in aid of a prosecution at law.

The charge of a usur-

pation of a franchise has,so frequently,9ccurred,and the remedy,
by injunction,so convenient and summary,that the jurisdiction of
this court would have been placed beyond all possibility of a
doubtand have been distinctly announced,by a series of presedents,
if any such general jurisdiction existed.

But I have searched,

in vain,for this authentic evidence of such power.

The precedents

are all in the writ of King's Benchand 'Kyd' cites nearly a hundred instanceswithin the-last centuryof informations filed in

the King's Bench to call in

question the exercise of a franchise.

(So also with the present "Raines" law.
payment of license would

Injunction toenforce

have been an easy method,but we find no

such exercise of the equity power.

On the other hand,we seein-

deed,hundreds of cases where failure to pay such tak has been the
foundation of suits in the law courts,and usuallyif not always,in
criminal actions).If the charge be of a criminal nature,or an ofence against the public,and does not touch the enjoyment of property,
it ought not to be brought within the direct jurisdiction of this
court,which was intended to deal only in matters of civil right,
resting in Equity,or where the remedy at law was not sufficiently
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Nor ought the process of injunction be applied but

adequate.

It, is' the strong arm of the court;

with the utmost caution.

and

operation benign and usefulit must be exercised

to render its

Assum-

with great discretion,and only when necessity requires it.

ing the charges in the information to be trueit does not appear
to me that the banking power,in this caseproduces

such imminent

and great mischief to #he community,as to call for this summary
remedy.
The English Court of Chancery rarely uses this processexcept
where the~right is
case renders it

established at lawor the exigency of the

first

.

indispensable

.

....

I know that the Court is

in the habit of restraining private nuisances to property,and of
quieting persons in.the enjoyment-of private right; but it is an
extremely rare caseand may be considered,if it ever happenedas
an anomoly,for a Court of equity to interfere at all,and mud

less

preliminarily,by injunction,to put down a public nuisance wkich did
not violate the.right of

roperty,but

only contravened

This information proceeds against

policy....

the general

the defendant

for a mere usurpation of power belonging to the government alone,
or to itsspsecial grantees

.

.

.

The plain state of the case

information is here filed by the Attorney General to

then isthat

red~ress and restrain by injunction, the usurpation of a franchise
which, if

true,amouints

to a breach of law,and of publc policy.

may venture to say that such a prosecution is
this court,but
of law.

it

is

suprted

without precedent

by a thousand precedents

in

I
in

a court

The whole question,upon the merits,is one of law,and
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not of equity.

The charge

is

meanor to belong to this court.

too much of the nature of a misdeThe process of injunction is

too

peremptory and powerful in its effects to be used in such a case as
this~without the clearest sanction.

I shall best consult the

utility and stability of the powers of this courtby not stretching
them beyond the limits prescribed by the precedentsU
It

seems that the above case is

cusgion,both in

analogous to the one under dis-

points of resemblance and in

similarity

of reason-

ing.

Both are statutory wrongs; but neither is declared a nuis-

ance.

Both are offences against the people as a wholeand are

prosecuted in the name of the people,but neither does any great
damage to the public at large,as both may be lawful by a precedent
compliance with certain formal rules,or payment of a money consideration.
act itself

Nor is

either inherently dangerousas

which constitutes

it

is

not the

the offence,but merely the lack of a

nominAl sanction,granted on the payment of money or compliance
with formal rules.
Village of Brockport v Johnston (a)

was an action by the

Village of Brockport to restrain defendant,Johnstonfrom erecting
wooden structures within limits forbidden by the by-laws of the
village.
Ac

The village was authorized to make such lawsunder an

of the Legislature.

It

was held that t"equity

will not inter-

fere by injunction to enforce a penal ordinance,unless
sought to be restrained is,in

(a)

13 Abb.N.C.468.

itself,a

nuisance':

the 'act
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In

Round Lake Association v Kellog (a).

this case the defendant

from an order of injunctionrestraining

asked relief

cer-

him in

Plain-

tain uses of premises leased by him for ninety-nine years.
tiff

claims right to fix a license fee for defendantand
It

this injunction pending the action.
business is

obtained

was held that as the
has shown

not claimed to be a nuisance,and plaintiff

no great or irreparable injury to follow on continuance of the
salethat an injunction would not lie.
Attorney General v New jersey Railway~b)
prevent an alleged public nuisance.
congruous and improper,for

An information was laid to

"It would seem,at first,in-

this court to interfere

The very fact that nuisances

public nuisance.

in

cases of

of that character

are offences against the communityand necessarily savor of criminality

in

a greater or less degree,would

seem to distinguish them as

matters not proper to be dealt with by this court
of public nuisanc6

there is

an undisputed jurisdiction in

common law courts by indictment;
to interfere in

.....

In

cases

the

and a court of equity ought not

a case of misdemeanor,* h8n the object sought can

be as well attained in
Thus we see in

all

the ordinary tribunalS.
the cases,equity

refuses to enjoin unless

plaintiff shows some ground for equitable interference.

In the

case of a license or privilege,between private individuals,equity
refuses to interfere unless the plaintiff
for equitable

jurisdiction;

TaY)F4iN-Y S. R. 29l.
(b)

2 Green Ch.136,

p.l

3 9.

he is

left

shows some valid ground
to his remedy at law.

Where
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the question comes up between the state or municipality and an
individual, even in a clearly civil case,still Equity refuses to
enjoin unless an injurious nuisance be shown.

And in all cases

of a criminal natureequity refuses to enjoin unless the crime be
a nuisance also,and aff~cting some individual in such a manneras
But no cases can be found where offences

to allow him an action.

declared by statute to be a crime,and expressly declared to be
punishable in a court of record,having jurisdiction to punish as
for a-felonywhich hold th-at the defendant can be brought before
an Equity court,and after being proven a criminal therein,can then
be enjoined from further acts of a criminal nature.
In Mayor of Hudson v Thorne

(a),Chancellor Walworth declared,

that it was no part of the business of a court of Equity,to enforce
the penal laws of the state by injunction,unless the act sought to
be restrained was a nuisance.

A case bearing directly on the

point at issue is Waupun v Moore (b).

It is there stated,that

a court of Equity will not enforce by injunction,a village ordinanceforbidding an act which is not a nuisance per se.

And this

is soalthough the very terms of the ordinance,declares such to be
the proper remedy.

Nor is the remedy at law inadequate,merely

because not stringent enough (c).
StorIn Parsons v Bedfrd (d),lays it down that the trial
by jury is not dependent on the form of the action,but on the real
substance as at common law.

{a)7
Cd)

-P-aige 261,p 264.
3 Pet.433,p. 4 45 .

"The trial by jury is justly dear

Cb) 34Wis. 450.

C-6F33 Mic.

-____
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It has always been an object of

to the American people.

deep interest and solicitudeand
wattched with treat jealousy.
originallj

every encroachment

on it

One of the strongest

has been

objections,

taken,against the Constitution of the United Stateswas

the want of an express provision securing the right of trial by
jury in

'No

civil cases.

wise reexaminable

in

fact

once tried by a jury,shall be other-

any court of the United Statesthan according

to the rules of the common law'.

By the common lawthey meant,

what the-constitution denominated in

the Third Article

merely suits,which the common law recognized among its
settled proceedingsbut

'law';

not

old and

suits in which legal rights were to be

ascertained and determined"
Irwin v Dixon (a),was a request for an injunction.

"This form of

remedy was one much questionedas permissible to the public or
individual in

case of a public right of this kind invaded.

And

when at last deemed allowable,it was Only whrre the commnity at
large,or some individualfelt ±nterested in having the supposed
ntisance immediately prostrated,on account of its
and irreparable

greatcontinued,

injury

The leading casesetting forth the rule regarding the restraining
of public nuisances by equityisCeity of Georgetown v Alexandria
Canal Co.(b)

A bill

was filed by plaintiff

struction of an aqueduct.

to restrain the con-

"Besides the remedy at law, it

7 .
-TT--9Howp._2"
See also,Osborne v U.S.Bnk,9 Wheat.840.
(b) 12 Pet.9l p.98
Inj. Ch.XI; I Story Eq. Jur.25.

is

now

-Edeno-n

27

settledthat a court of Equity may take jurisdiction in cases of
public nuisanceby an information filed with the Attorney General.
This jurisdiction seems to have been acted on with great caution
and hesitancy.........Yet the jurisdiction has been finally
sustainedupon the principle that Equity

can give more adequate

and complete relief than can be obtained at law.
Whilst,therefor9
it is admitted by all that it is confessedly one of delicacyand accordingly the instances of its exercise are rare,e

it may be

exercised in those cases in which there is imminent danger of
mischief before the tardiness of the law could reach it"
The other casewhere the Attorney General can get an injunctionis
whete t4e public health is threatened by a nuisance(a).
The

case of In re Debs,Petitioner(b),will be treated more fully

in the next chapter,but it may be cited here as additional proof
of the rule that,"The jurisdiction of Chancery with regard to
public nuisances is founded on the irreparable damage to individuals or the great public injury likely to ensud"(p.592)
Where a delay can safely be toleratedthe usual remedy in such
cases,by or on behalf of the public,is by indictment,rather than
injunction(c).a

(a) Attorney Gen.v Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp.133 Mass.361.
(b) 158 U.Sb. 564.
Cc) 12 Pet. 98; 19 Pick.154; 2 Story's Eq. Jur.92
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It seems,thereforethat nuisances may be abated,but only after a
proper actionor in extreme cases summarily,where a statute,based
on the police power,so declares..
exercise the Police power.
case of nuisance.

But even them only in a valid

An indictment may also be had in a

This action is brought by the public prosecutor

in a case where the criminal law covers the facts.

The remedy of

injunction may be had by a private individual where the nuisance
causes him special damage,and both the other remedies are inadequate,as where he fears irreparable injury.
secutor

Or the public pro-

may get an injunction to restrain a public nuisance,but

only where there is danger of irreparable damage to the public,or
injury to their health.
The mere sale of liquor without a licensecauses no more damage to
4n individual or to the puiblic than a sale under a license.

(The

only damage to the public,in such a caseis the loss of the license
fee.

This cannot be called irreparable damage)

Such being the

case,(Sec."29") of the New York Liquor Tax law,is unconstitutional,
as

extending the jurisdiction of Equity,without a juryto cases whe
wherein a jury trial has always been had as of right heretofore.
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IV

CHAPTER

LEGISLATIVE ENCROACHMENTS ON THE RIGHT
OF
TRIAL BY JURY.

"To err is human".

Every man makes a mistake or comnitts a

wrong sometime in his life; but the welfare and safety of society
demands he be punished when such wrongs assume proportions dangerous to the rights of others.

No excuses are accepted.

man must be supposed to know the law.
are plainly set forth.

Every

The penalties for violation
A

To break a law entails punishment.

method has been adopted by the peopleby means of which,the question of the breach is decided.

This is a vital question to the

one charged withe the offence.

It is a qiestion of fact,and

needs no legal learning to decide it.

The decision of the people

based on centuries of trial and usage,is,that twelve menthe peers
of the accusedare the fittest to determine the qtestion.

The

people having thus decidedhave placed a provision in their constitutiondeclaring that,"In all cases where the jury trial was
had heretoforeit shall remain inviolate forever7
no theoretical discussions of this clause.

There can be

It is an absolute

rule founded on the experience of centuries,and upheld by the
master minds of the race,as a safeguard against tyrznny. The tyrants
of the present day are not Kings ,Emperors,or Oligarchs, but
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"legislative majorities''
political

And in the present condition of

combination and strifesuch

majorities would be dangerous
Tie se

indeed,were it not for the restrictions of the Constitution.
restrictions are the rules which govern in

that border regionwhere

the power of the government,and individual liberty conflict.
Where they applythey are supreme and cannot be contravened.
Criminal acts,as existing heretofore,pure
trial.

This cannot be contested.

and simpledemand a jury

But can a legislature de-

clare an actwhich heretofore was merely a crimeto be also a nuisanceand as such cognizable

in

a court of Equity ?

Equity can

only take cognizance of a supposed nuisancewhere it is such in
The legislature

fact, or has been declared so by statute.
declare a thing to be a nuisance,which,in its

cannot

very nature and in

facthas none of the elements of a nuisance.
Let it

be granted that

traffic.
hibit it.

the legislature

Cant'..regulate it ?

can prohibit a certain

Certainly,because it may pro-

But could the legislature prohibit it arbitrarilyby

the use of some cruel or unusual method ?

If notthencan the

traffic be fegulatedso that a breach of a rule entails some cruel
or unusual punishment
by due process of law.

?

No,the procedure in

The legislature may declare that the sale

of liquor without a license
been; but it

is

to be a misdemeanor,as

unconstitutional to decree

shall be punished by contempt proceedings
act

such cases must be

it

has always

that such misdemeanor
in

an Equity court.

The

of selling liquor without a license,is either a criminal or

a civil wrong.

If

it

be criminal then Equity has no jurisdiction,
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If

in the absence of danger of irreparable damage.

it

be a civil

wrong,it is against the people onlyand is theAmount of the tax.
But absolutely no althority can be found,allowing Equity to enforce

a tax levy Thrpersonal injunction on pain of punishment by contempt
proceedings.

If

such were the caseany class of persons could be

put in jail at the wish of the legislatureby levying a heavy tax
on them,and on their refusal commanding an Equity Court to put them
in

jail by contempt proceedings.

The question,whether
nuisancewhether

in

the legislature can declare a thing to be a
fact it

is

or is

not suchis not up for dis-

eussion in the present caseas the New York Liquor Tax law does
not,in any of its provisionsdeclare sales without a license to be
a nuisance.

But if anyone who pays th

fee may sell,then the

mere failure to pay such fee is not of itself a nuisance.
sale of liquor without paying a license fee is
fact from the sale after paying it.

The

not different -in

The fact may bethat the

mariner of the sale of liquor by the one who has paid the tak may
be more of a nuisance than the mere sale without such payment.
The facts in both cases are absolutely identicalwith the exception
of the payment of the fee.

And how the mere failure to pay the

stipulated sum of money can be a nuisance is

beyond ordinary com-

p,r ehensi on.
If

such sale is

when it
so (even

is
if

not a nuisance; and we fail

not so in
it

to see how it

can be,

fact,and the legislature has not declared

has such powerwhich is

doubtful)

it

then the legis-

lature has not the authority to direct an issue to be tried in

an

A
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equity court.
The act is one which is,and akways has beenregarded as criminal in
its

nature,and therefore

equity has not jurisdiction

to enjoin,un-

less there be great or irreparable:: harm threateningwhich
be compensated by damages.
Aalutory effects fromni
if

cannot

The ,remedy by injunction derives its

power of prohibiting future acts.

But

an injunction would prohibit future sales,by fear of punishment;

an indictment would prohibit them far more fully,by putting it
beyond the power of the defendant
tion is

to sell at ,all.

far speedier and more nearly final in

application for injunction.

In

If

results

fact we find there is

no ground for equitable jurisdiction,but
legislature.

its

The legal ac-

the full rights

absolutely

the arbitrary will of the

of the defendant,as

secured in

the Constitution,could be had in an equity court,then it
take cognizancein the discretion of the legislature.
legislature

han an

has not the pcwer,to indirectly

wuld

But the

cut off a constitu-

tion&l guaranty by directly transferring a legal action into an
equity court,and thus cutting off the right of trial by jury.
"The proposition that remedies may be altered by the legislature,
is subject to the. supreme qualification that no constitutional
right can be infringed by any alteration of remedies"

(a)

The great rise and expansion of late of such legislation as
section "29"

of the

"Raines"
...
law, is

decision of the United States in

due in no slight degree to th~e
the case of In

re Debs(b).

As

the outcome of the doctrine there laid down may be far reaching in

(a) King v Hopkins,57 N.H.334 p.353.
(b) 158 U.S.564.
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its effects,it may be well to discu6

someeof the principles and

reasoning therein set forth.
A man may lawfully quit work whenever he pleases,and the reason or
object for which he quits is a purely private matter.
All the men in a certain employment may simultaneously quit work,
and remain away until their demands are satisfied.
If there be no combination among them,but they merely stop work,
*

then their act is lawful.

If,however,they form a combinationand

by their united force conspire to compel acquiescehce in their
wishes,then their act is unlawful.

Not the act of quitting work,

but the act of combining and conspiring.
Men may endeavor to influence others to quit work by argument,or
other means,but cannot go so far as to use forcefraud,intimidation,or threats.
In the "Debs" case,the United States Court took jurisdiction
because the acts complained of were interfering with interstate
conmerce and obstructing the mails.
injunction.

But the remedy sought was by

The ground shown for equitable jurisdiction was that

the acts of the defendant constituted

a public ntisance.

To

grant an injunction in such a case it must be shown that some
itreparable injury was threatened,or the public health imperilled.
The facts,on which the order of injunction was

ased,were stated

as follows: "The vast interests involved,not merely of the city
of Chicago and the State of Illinois,but of all the states,and the
general confusion into which interstate commerce was thrown; the
forcible interference with that commerce; the attempted exercise
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by

individuals of powers belonging only to governmentand the

threatened continuance of suda
a condition of affairs,which

invasions of public right,presented
called for the fullest exercise of

all the powers of the courts"
It requires some little stretch of imagination to perceive iii the
foregoing factsany results differing from those which usually
follow the commission of crimes

against the public.

The act of

a train robber in stopping a train,produces the same results; the
difference in damage being of degree merely.

But it would lardly

be contested that he could be enjoined in equity.
caused the damage was the combination,not Debs.

The act which
It was the men's

united action which caused the "tie up" of the railroads,not the
mere order of Debs.

If t1ere was any public nuisance,the com-

bination and conspiracy alone was the nuisance,and the act of Debs
was the purely criminal one of instigating a nuisance.

The pun-

ishment of such an act had always been an indictment,and it should
have been so in this case.
In his opinion (p.581) Judge Brewer quotes the Federal guaranty
of "jury trial in all criminal cases,except impeachmentin
state where the crime was committed.

the

Fe then goes on to say:If

all the inhabitants of the state,or even a great body of them,
should combine to obstruct interstate cormarce or the transportation of the rails,prosecutions for such offences,haa in such a
community,would be~doomed in advance to failure.
This is declarinlg,that as

juries might be swayed by popular

feeling,in certain cases,therefore they should not be allowed to
hear such cases.

Thus a single judge deprives a person of a
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cOlstitutional

right,because

do its duty.

he fears the enforcing power will not

The jury has heretofore been found the bulwark

aga.inst the arbitrary power of the government.
declared

that it

that the jury is

shall comtinue so to be.

The people have

Whenever the time comes

found incapable of performing its

people will make such changes as they see fit.

functionsthe
Until that time

comes the jury remains supreme in

its

with any judgehowever eminent,to

ta.ke a proper case from themon

own sphereand it

the ground that they might,being swayed by
charge the prisoner.

The people in

p

lies

not

popular feelingdis-

securing the trial

by jury,

adopted it faults as well as benefitsand no judge has the right
to speculate whether,in a given case,the faults outweigh the benefits,and on the outcome of his speculationsto
the culprit
The vital

arbitrarily deptive

of the right of a jury trial.

point of the whole case,and the reason why equity assum-

ed jurisdictionwas

because

it

was feared the jurors would not do

their duty,being swayed by popular feeling.

But this was the very

argument advanced against the right of free verdict in

the early

English cases.
In the case of Sir Nicholas Thockmorton,tried in 1554(a),the
judge sentenced the jury to jail for acquitting the prisoner.
putting a jury in
is

after doing what they thought their duty,

not as bad as depriving them entirely of the chance to do their

duty.

(

(a)

jail

But

1st of Mary.
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The old case of William Penn has a strange analogy to the
"Debs" case.

Penn was indicted in 1670 (22 Chas.II) for having

with divers other personsunlawfully and tumultuously,congregated
themselves in Gracechurch Street,London"

The indictment also set

forth that Pennin the open street,"did preach and speak to persons
in the street assembled,by reason whereof a great concourse and
tumult of people,a long time did remain and continue in contempt
of the king and his law,and to the great terror and disturbance of
Penn was a Quakerand his

many of his liege people and subjects

speech to the people was distasteful to the government,as that
class were not in favor at the time.
brought in a verdict of
judge.

He was tried,and the jury

"not guilty",against the direction of the

They were each fined and sent to "Newgate" for non-payment

They were subsequently released on a writ of habeas corpus returnable in the Court of Common Pleas.
The defendant in the case shortly afterwatds left Englaid,and
founded the second largest stateand the third largest city,in our
land.

The city in which the "liberty bell" first tolled the

birth of the Union.

But were Penn now in Chicago and caused

"

a

great concourse afd tumult of people to assemble and temain,in
contempt of the law'he would be enjoined by our courts,arx

then

being guilty of contempt thereof,would be summarily put in jail.
He would not be allowed a trial

by jury,as such~a prosecution would

on account of public opinion,"be doomed in advance to failure.
It

seems highly impertinent to criticise

the reasoning of a judge
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of our highest tribunal,but it has never before been asserted as a
reason for taking a case into equitythat the legal remedy was
inadequate,because of an inherent defect in the jury system.
The decision in this case caused a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction among the laboring classes

7

It seems to them,the Court

held that a combination of workingmen,to cause an increase of
wages

(a benefit to the many,and detriment to by few),or to protect

the rights of their weakerrbretheren,is a conspiracy,a crimea tort
a nuisance; in fact,everything wrongso that it could be attacked
from all sides;-while combinations of "Uoal Barons",to raise the
price of coal to the many to benefit themselves;

"Pools" of railway

"Magnates" to increase rates to the travelling public; combinations
of oil "Kings",to tax an increase of the poor man's day; in truth,
all combinations of capital increase and grow stronger with never
a hindrance from the courts.
things should be so;

It seems strange to them that such

it may be remarked,incidentallythat their

bewilderment is said to be shared by many who claim some insight
into the "sternal fitness of things".
It was laid down Denio,C.J.,(a) that oftences under the liquor
laws,were punishable only after a jury trialat the time of the
adoption of the constitution,and a law directing them to be tried
before a 6ourt of Special Sessions,does away with that right and
is void.
Although the constitution of 1870 grants Courts of Special Sessions
jurisdiction in cases of misdemeanor,ini the discretion of the legislature,it does not,i

facto,allow an Equity court to take
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cognizance of such misdemeanors.
The opinion by Judge Field in Carleton v Rugg(a),is very pertinent to the matter in hand,and applies diredtly go a state of
affairs arising under section "f29?? of the "Raines"

law.

" The Massachusetts statute was not paied for the abatement of
a nuisance,by destroying or changing the character of tangible
property,or by removing obstructions to the exercise of a public
right.

Its purpose was,I think,to prevent the illegal sale of

intoxicating liqu~r,by punishing by fine or imprisonmentor both,
without limitin the discretion of the courtany person who sells,
or keeps such-liquors for sale,after he has been enjoined by the
court.

The prevention of crire,by the punishment of persons
The

found guilty of an offence against a general law,is aimed at.
legislature cannot do indirectly what it cannot ido directly;

it

cannot change the nature of things,by affixing to them new names.
If the legislatureby statutecan authorize a court,in a public
prosecutionto enjoin any person from illegally keeping or selling
intoxicating liquorsin any specified place within the Ceommonwealt
why can it not authorize a court to enjoin any person from illegally keeping or selling intoxicating liquors axywhere within the
(This is precisely what is done under section
And if this can be dome,
"29" of the New York Liquor Tax LawJ

Commonwealth ?

why can it not authorize a court at the suit of the Commonwealth,
to enjoin any person,from doing any illegal or criminal act ,anywhere within the Comrnonwealth,and so try without a jury,any person

so enjoined on a charge of having violated the injunction, and

(a)

149 Mass.550.

to
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punish him by fine and imprisonmentwithout

the court

limit,if

find him guilty ?.........If this jurisdiction were confined to
crimes having some direct relation to a particular buildingplace,
or temement,the number of such crimes is

large,and ail

crimes have

they must be committed somewhere.

some relation to place,as

It was not the intention of the constitution that persons should
be punished for viilating general laws by proceedings in Equity,
or by a Court acting without a jury,and subject

to no limitation
The

on its power to fine and imprison,except its own discretion.

safeguards of the common law were carefully secured by the Declaration of Rights,both in public prosecutions,and in private suits,
'except in cases where it has heretofore been otherwise used and
practiced!

This is not such a caseand the only thing novel

about it is the proedure.

Statutes against illegally selling ,

or keeping for sale intoxicating liquors,from earliest timeshave
been enforced by criminal complaints or indictments,or by penal
actions.

Such statutes were never enforced

when the Constitution was adopted.

in

Equity anywhere

I think the statute under

which the present proceedings were brought,is inconsistent with
Article XII of the Declaration of Rights"
In the same case Knowlton J.,states that there is a difference
between restraining the place of sale and the act of selling.
former being a nuisance,and the latter

a criminal act pure and

simple,and not subject to equitable cognizance.
anomalous proceeding,for

The

"It

would be an

a court to enjoin a defendant from comm-

itting the crime of larceny, or of selling liquor,withW a view to
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punish as disobedience

of the injunctionand contempt of court,the

same act which was before punishable as a crime.

If

that muld be

donean accused person through a mere change of form in the proceedings,might

be punished for a crime without a trial

by juryand

in violation of both the Federal and State Constitutions"
CONCLUSION.

It

seems,therefore,that

section "29"

of the New York

Liquor Tax Law is merely a piece of legislative circumlocution,
adopted by the legislature to expedite conviction under the Liquor
Tax Law.
the efforts

Undoubtedlya speedy trial

is

a much desired objectand

of the legislature to aid this end are appreciated;

the provisions of the Constitution are superior to all

but

theories or

designs of the legislature,and must not be contravened.
For the reasons Ie-reinbefore set forthwe think section "29"
of the New York Liquor Tax Law is
2 of the New York Constitution.

in

conflict with Article I Section

